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Models, Mathematics and Deleuze’s Philosophy: Some
Remarks on Simon Duffy’s Deleuze and the History of
Mathematics: In Defence of the New
Simon Duffy (2013) Deleuze and the History of Mathematics: In
Defence of the New, London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Simon Duffy’s Deleuze and the History of Mathematics is a major stage
in Deleuze interpretation because it demonstrates a series of important
points for the reception of Deleuze’s work. These can be put quite
simply, without taking anything away from Duffy’s intricate analyses of
philosophy and mathematics. First, despite a relative lack of prominence,
mathematics plays a significant role in Deleuze’s philosophy; second,
though not a highly trained mathematician, Deleuze is very proficient
on the history of mathematics; third, in relation to his philosophical
system, Deleuze has original things to say about that history; fourth, it is
possible to see Deleuze as a distinctive figure in the line of philosophers
close to mathematics, such as Leibniz, Bergson, Russell and Badiou; and
fifth, there are many concepts in Deleuze’s work that benefit from a
knowledge of their mathematical influences.
These achievements go a long way to explaining why Duffy’s book
must be seen as one of the most noteworthy and original works of
Deleuze interpretation. It fills a gap in the reception of Deleuze’s work,
by completing studies started by Manuel DeLanda and added to by,
among others, Daniel S. Smith, Sean Bowden and Henry Somers-Hall.
DeLanda, Bowden and Somers-Hall are subject to tough critiques in the
conclusion to Duffy’s book, despite their contributions to the general
theme of the book. Without taking sides, the ensuing debates are to
be recommended as an example of fruitful academic debate around
Deleuze’s work.
Duffy’s emphasis on complete interpretation and his discovery of
overlooked areas do not fully capture the controversial aspects of
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his book. His deepest and most far-reaching claim is of a different
kind of originality to academic thoroughness. He proposes an overall
interpretative approach to Deleuze’s philosophy. A consequence of this
approach is to bind the philosophy very tightly to mathematics in ways
that I want to question. It is easy to overlook this aspect of Duffy’s work
because it is attached to a single claim and to one concept: the concept
of model. Here is the key passage where Duffy’s thesis is laid out in full:
The mathematical problematics extracted from the history of mathematics
are directly redeployed by Deleuze in order to reconfigure particular
philosophical problematics in relation to the history of philosophy. This is
achieved by mapping the alternative lineages in the history of mathematics
onto corresponding alternative lineages in the history of philosophy, i.e.
by isolating those points of convergence between the mathematical and
philosophical problematics extracted from their respective histories. This is
achieved by using the mathematical problems of these alternative lineages
in the history of mathematics as models to reconfigure the philosophical
problems by constructing an alternative image in the history of philosophy.
The redeployment of mathematical problematics as models for philosophical
problematics is one of the strategies that Deleuze employs in his engagement
with and reconfiguration of the history of philosophy. (3)
To understand the scope and depth of these claims, it is helpful to
focus first on the concept of problematics. It corresponds to two related
ideas in Deleuze’s work: the universal concept of a problem and the
local problem of a limitation within a system. These can be rendered as
‘problem’ in ordinary parlance (‘the problem of justice’, ‘the problem of
how to surmount this new obstacle’) but that is imprecise. The first use
of problem means an underlying and universal virtual series of different
intensive directions that demand a response. Unpacked, this definition
means that a problem is virtual and universal as such (it is not about an
actual and particular identified state). A problem involves a multiplicity
of different pulls that cannot be reduced to a single or even countable
number of options that can be judged satisfactorily. These pulls are
intensive, rather than ones of fixed magnitude or made of discrete steps.
A problem is only complete when expressed in a new way that responds
to the tensions.
Virtual problems generate series of different solutions, which
themselves express and transform the problem in different ways. There
are two ways to begin to simplify problems. We can think of them
as complex and recurrent puzzles requiring practical but necessarily
incomplete solutions. Or we can think of them as different kinds of
paradox generated from within a system. For example, we could think
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of the Foucauldian problem of discipline (the puzzle of disciplinary
societies) with different pulls around intensive directions towards
growing punishment, diminishing education, increasing correction,
declining security, and so on. Different prison and punishment systems
provide actual but never finally satisfactory solutions to the ongoing
and shifting underlying virtual problem. Or we could think of a
problem around continuity and discontinuity in space as expressed in
Zeno’s paradoxes, then given a partial solution by Bergson’s account of
movement as indivisible. Importantly, even if the paradox is dispelled
the problem always remains in a different form.
The second use of problem, the one I have associated with a limitation
within a system, has virtual and actual manifestation. It is closer to
the common idea of a practical problem, but should be thought more
precisely as a pressure point that puts a system under unbearable strain
forcing it to change. So in an actual situation such a problem would be
something like an epidemic of prison riots, or a deep funding crisis, or
an extreme turning point in ideal or practical environments, such as the
realisation of a serious historical wrong or reaching the breaking point
of essential materials at a certain scale.
In a virtual problem, the idea of a limit-problem marks the point
where virtual problems of different types meet, when prompted by
an actual expression, and force each other into transformations and
reconfigurations; for instance, when the incarceration problem meets the
emancipation problem along a series of fault lines prompted by an actual
historical event – the advent of universal suffrage, for instance.
These different versions of the problem, as universal and as singular
limit, both virtual and actual, are always found together and cannot
make full sense apart. This explains why Deleuze pairs universal with
singular and with individual: as universal, a problem is incomplete
unless determined by the singular and expressed through the individual.
In Difference and Repetition, the universal – singular pairing is often
treated through mathematics (grist to Duffy’s mill) but also in relation
to learning (less grist there). The universal – individual pairing is treated
in relation to eternal return and the individual (minimal grist indeed):
‘These Ideas, however, are expressed in individuating factors, in the
implicated world of intensive quantities which constitute the universal
concrete individuality of the thinker or the system of the dissolved Self’
(Deleuze 1994: 259).
For instance, the actual global scandal of mass incarceration
of different minorities to reassure a majority of its false freedom
cannot be separated from a virtual history of ideal problems around
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freedom, emancipation, security, wealth, demonisation, oppression and
exploitation, and a history of successive actual ‘solutions’ to the limits
encountered at both ideal and actual levels. But these actual solutions
must not be seen as strictly general. Instead, they are only fully expressed
and explained in the individual shame of past errors and the shame of
their repetition in new forms of actual oppression and restricted liberty.
To take a contemporary scandal: the universal problem of movement
and its restriction is expressed in the general plight of refugees, but only
achieves its full expression as actual in individual shame and individual
suffering, which can both be collective, though not universal.
The reference to Foucault is telling. This is because in the same way
that Deleuze’s book on Foucault provides a new vision of Foucault’s
works as a whole (the diagram of Foucault), the two versions of the
idea of a problem can be taken as a way of giving a diagram of
Deleuze’s system, at least in the mature form it reaches inDifference and
Repetition. Virtual Ideas in Deleuze’s masterwork are to be understood
as virtual problems that have been constructed in response to actual and
virtual limits to Deleuze’s own system as it develops through his earlier
readings of Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant and Spinoza (and, as Duffy
shows us, many mathematicians).
When Duffy speaks of ‘direct redeployment’ of mathematical
problematics onto philosophical ones, we should not understand this as
a claim about part of Deleuze’s system or as a result of it, but rather as
a claim about the construction of the main concepts and diagram of the
system. And when Duffy follows this with the idea of ‘reconfiguring’ the
philosophical problematics, it should not be viewed as minor tinkering,
but rather much closer to a eureka moment: ‘By Jove, it’s mathematical
problems I should be modelling on!’ a Deleuze disguised as Holmes
might say. The system comes to work as a system of problems of
different kinds, because it is modelled on work in mathematics by
Leibniz, Maimon, Bergson, Riemann and Lautman.
‘To reconfigure’ and ‘to redeploy’ are metaphors here. They are loose
terms leading into the main technical concept of Duffy’s argument: ‘to
model’. The transition first takes place through the term ‘mapping’,
which can be understood as a function from the treatment of
problem from the history of mathematics to Deleuze’s philosophy as
a construction with components from the history of philosophy, though
the idea of a component is a loaded and unsatisfactory term–maybe
the ideas of ‘lines’ would be better. Mapping gives the idea of a set
mapping onto another set, but the more precise sense of what Duffy
is driving at is of the mapping of a structure between the two sets. The
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structure of problems is extracted from the two historical disciplines and
reconfigured from mathematics to philosophy.
This structural sense of modelling discounts other ways of
understanding the terms. This is not modelling as in the copy of a
figure, or the idea of a model in scientific practice, where the model
works as a formal theoretical construct with explanatory and predictive
roles, open to empirical testing. Instead, ‘to model’ is reconfiguration
through an alternative image, where the image is a structure borrowed
from mathematics, rather than a picture to be copied. Duffy develops
this thought by referring to Deleuze’s distinction, from Difference
and Repetition, between metaphor or analogy and the model: ‘what
distinguishes a modelling relation from a relation of analogy or
metaphor is that there are “correspondences without resemblances”
between them’ (3). The correspondence is not about content, therefore,
but about form. Duffy renders this as an absence of a correspondence
between ‘elements’ but correspondence in ‘conceptualizable character’,
a term taken from Deleuze’s Cinema 2.
In Cinema 2, Deleuze uses the idea of conceptualisable character in
opposition to scientific metaphor and laborious applications of science
to other fields. For the former, the problem is its arbitrary nature;
there is no wider justification for adopting the metaphor. For the latter,
it is the problem of a forced application, where a different subject
is bent to a scientific approach rather than converging with it. By
conceptualisable character Deleuze means that a conceptual feature,
such as a particular account of space or time, can be extracted from a
science or from mathematics and used to explain a feature in cinema,
such as amorphous spaces in Ozu or Antonioni, where spaces lose
their Euclidean coordinates and appear empty and shapeless, without
homogeneous relations between parts (Deleuze 1985: 169).
To move into a more critical mode, I think this is a much more open
and flexible understanding of conceptualisability than Duffy allows,
because the idea of extraction is a wider and more varied process than
Duffy envisages for the relation to mathematics. Duffy adds the concept
of model and ideas of problematics, mapping and correspondence to the
process of extraction. This is a formal restriction of the process. Deleuze
is much more pragmatic, because his aim is explanation, rather than the
tighter definition of problematics.
Different auteurs and different films will benefit from different
explanatory strategies and there is the possibility of mixing sources and
transforming them so long as the explanation is effective in unfolding a
particular treatment of time in film, for example, or figure in painting, or
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conceptual creation in philosophy. The correspondence could be about
some content that is conceptualised in a different context; for instance,
when Deleuze extracts features from literature (Lawrence and shame;
Dickens and ‘a life’).
An initial understanding of the difficulty Duffy’s work faces as an
overall interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophy is then how to account
for the ‘synchretism’ and constructivism of Deleuze’s work: its mixture
of sources, styles, ideas, subjects, bodies, times, spaces in pragmatic and
experimental attempts to release intensity cautiously, but maximally too.
In my view, Duffy’s strong mathematisation of Deleuze is an undue
restriction on his pragmatics and creative experimentation, as we have
seen in the non-mathematical treatments of universal, singular and
individual in learning and in the reading of Nietzsche’s eternal return
in Difference and Repetition. Put in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s
work, my claim would then be that Duffy’s concept of a model is
not consistent with their concept of the assemblage. An assemblage is
never modelled on another structure. It might borrow from it and even
take it in as complete structure, but this will always be according to a
pragmatic transformation that goes beyond the tracing of a conceptual
correspondence between assemblage and model.
It is open for Duffy to respond that the variety of sources and ideas
shown by Deleuze are consistent with the mathematical interpretation.
So the claim is that mathematics offers not the model, but a model. The
ambiguity around the scope of Duffy’s claim can be seen in this passage:
While for Lautman, a mathematical problem is resolved by the development
of a new mathematical theory, definition, or axiom, for Deleuze, it is the
construction of a concept that offers a solution to a philosophical problem,
even if our understanding of the genesis of this newly constructed concept
is modelled on the Lautmanian account of the mathematical real. (131; my
emphasis)
The italics are mine, to stress the question of whether we should
see mathematical modelling as the main way of understanding the
construction of Deleuze’s concepts, or one way among many.
According to my reading, it is the stronger of the two claims, given the
preponderance of the idea of model in Duffy’s interpretation of Deleuze’s
concepts: in defining the concepts of singularity and continuity; in
understanding the logic of different/ciation (46; this is also where the
idea of correspondence without resemblance operates, 45); in relations
between objects of sensation and continuity (112); in the definition
of the concept of problem (83, 131); in understanding Deleuze’s
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‘more epistemologically modest’ alternative to Badiou’s mathematical
foundationalism (138, 154, 159); in the distinction between virtual and
actual (182n.); and perhaps most of all in Duffy’s concluding thoughts
about ‘the role of mathematics in determining the structure of Deleuze’s
philosophy’ (173).
This divergence of kinds of interpretation can be summed up in this
way. Does the concept of a method, as applied to Deleuze’s philosophy
as mathematically determined by extraction and structural mapping,
show the fundamental approach to explaining Deleuze’s philosophy?
Or is this one approach among many? But if it is the latter, does that
not alter the status of the method and its form? Should we not see
Deleuze’s philosophy as much more eclectic and loose in its pragmatic
and experimental approach, to the point where its systematic structure
must itself be seen as more open, fluid and changeable than provided
for by mathematical history? Finally, does Deleuze’s philosophy not
suggest ideas of time and history that challenge the idea of the historical
development of mathematics found in Lautman’s subtle structural
Platonism? If that is right, then the philosophical creativity, found
for example in Deleuze’s reworking of Stoicism or Nietzsche’s eternal
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Models, Mathematics and Deleuze’s Philosophy:
A Reply to Williams
I am grateful to James Williams for singling out my work on Deleuze
for discussion, in particular my work on Deleuze’s relation to and use
of mathematics. I also acknowledge his very generous comments about
the contribution that my efforts have made to the recent reception of
Deleuze’s work. In general, I endorse Williams’s characterisation of
the different ways of thinking about problems in Deleuze, although
I question whether a ‘consequence of [my] approach is to bind the
philosophy very tightly to mathematics in ways that’ Williams should be
